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CONSTRUCTION LAW
D. Stan Barnhill *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will review recent judicial decisions of significance
in Virginia affecting owners, contractors, and design professionals
in the construction context. It will also discuss the most signifi-
cant changes to the American Institute of Architects ("AIA")
standard owner/contractor and owner/architect contracts, as man-
ifested by the issuance of new versions of these contracts in late
2007.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Mechanic's Liens
Over the course of the last several years a number of court de-
cisions have addressed Virginia's mechanic's lien laws. One of the
most significant is Britt Construction, Inc. v. Magazzine Clean,
L.L.C.1 In Britt, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial
court's decision invalidating twelve mechanic's liens filed by a
general contractor against a construction project. 2 On its face, the
ruling appears simple and straightforward. Prior to the lien fil-
ings, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 43-4
in 2003 to require the contractor to file, "along with the memo-
randum of lien," a "certification of mailing" stating that a copy of
* Partner, Woods Rogers, PLC, Roanoke, Virginia. J.D., 1983, Washington and Lee
University School of Law; M.S., 1973, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University;
B.S., 1971, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1. 271 Va. 58, 623 S.E.2d 886 (2006).
2. Id. at 61, 62, 64, 623 S.E.2d at 887, 889.
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the memorandum had been sent to the owner's last known ad-
dress.3 The contractor in Britt did not file such certificate until
over six months after his first lien filings and two months after
his last.4
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the contractor's argu-
ment that the "certification" requirement was a mere notice pro-
vision and not part of the perfection process. 5 Instead, the court
found that the General Assembly's choice of the words "file" and
"along with" signaled a legislative intent for the certification and
memorandum to be filed together in order to perfect the lien. 6
The court similarly rejected the contractor's argument that the
General Assembly's failure to make the "certification" require-
ment an express condition of perfection, unlike the affirmative
language to that effect in Virginia Code sections 43-7 and 43-9,
signaled a legislative intent not to make filing the certification fil-
ing a perfection requirement. 7 The court reasoned that when a
statute is clear on its face, looking to other statutes is unneces-
sary to interpret its meaning.8
It did not take long for an owner to attempt to use the legisla-
tive change to section 43-4 to nullify a subcontractor's lien claim.
In Capstone Contracting Co. v. American Eagle Self Storage,
L.L.C., the owner contended that a subcontractor's failure to file
its section 43-4 certificate at the time it filed its lien rendered the
3. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 698, 2003 Va. Acts 931 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-4 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
4. Britt, 271 Va. at 61, 623 S.E.2d at 887.
5. Id. at 62, 623 S.E.2d at 887-88.
6. Id. at 63, 623 S.E.2d at 888-89. Apparently, the contractor in Britt did not argue
that "along with" does not mean "at the same time." A credible argument could have been
made that "along with" simply adds a notice requirement without specifying when it must
be satisfied. The Britt decision, however, having interpreted "along with" temporally, has
now foreclosed that argument.
7. Id. at 64, 623 S.E.2d at 889. Both Virginia Code sections 43-7 and 43-9 expressly
state that in addition to complying with the requirements of section 43-4, subcontractors
"in order to perfect the lien ... shall ... give notice in writing to the owner of the proper-
ty." VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-7, 43-9 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
8. Britt, 271 Va. at 64, 623 S.E.2d at 889. The Britt decision does not address one
argument that the contractor could have made to invite a different result. In Mills v.
Moore's Super Stores, Inc., the court held that a subcontractor's obligation to give notice to
the owner, as set forth in Virginia Code sections 43-7 and 43-9, need not be given at the
time the lien is filed, even though such notice is part of the perfection process. 217 Va. 276,
279-80, 227 S.E.2d 719, 722-23 (1976). Thus, the subcontractor who did not send the no-
tice until after the six-month perfection period nevertheless possessed a valid claim. Id. at
282-83, 227 S.E.2d at 724. How can this decision and Britt be reconciled?
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lien invalid.9 The owner argued that a subcontractor's perfection
statute, section 43-7, requires the subcontractor not only to give
notice of the lien to the owner, but also to "comply with ... 43-
4."10 Compliance, the owner contended, required the subcontrac-
tor to file the section 43-4 certification with its memorandum.11
The trial court in Capstone rejected the owner's argument,
finding that the "certification" requirement is only imposed on the
general contractor based on limiting language in the statute.1 2
Subcontractors, therefore, only need to file their memorandum
and give notice to the owner of the amount and character of the
lien as mandated in their particular perfection statutes.1 3
In T&M Electric, Inc. v. ProLogis Trust, the trial court rejected
efforts by a general contractor and various subcontractors to ad-
vance lien claims against an owner for tenant improvements to
the owner's building.14 The court rejected the contention that un-
der Virginia Code section 43-20, tenant improvements could be
the basis for liens affecting the owner's property rights.15 The
court observed there was no credible evidence that: (1) the owner
had authorized the improvements (mere consent not being suffi-
cient); (2) the owner was an agent of the tenant, or vice versa; (3)
the claimants had notified the owner that they were looking to it
for payment while performing their work; or (4) the lease re-
quired the tenant to make the improvements.1 6 Consequently,
9. 72 Va. Cir. 473, 474 (Cir. Ct. 2007) (Prince George County).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 474-75. By its own terms, the certificate requirement of section 43-4 applies
only to "a lien claimant who is a general contractor." See VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Cum.
Supp. 2008).
13. See Capstone, 72 Va. Cir. at 475. The court in Capstone did add that the subcon-
tractor must also send a copy of the memorandum to the owner. Id. In 2007, the General
Assembly modified Virginia Code section 43-4 to make clear what the Capstone court in-
ferred, adding "and not lien claimants under §§ 43-7 and 43-9" to the statute to exclude
expressly any obligation for subcontractors to comply with the "certificate" requirement.
Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 505, 2007 Va. Acts 689 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §
43-4 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
14. 70 Va. Cir. 403, 405 (Cir. Ct. 2006) (Loudoun County).
15. Id. at 404-05.
16. Id. The court in ProLogis cited three prior Supreme Court of Virginia decisions as
providing the source of factors that could have led to a different result but were absent in
the instant case. Id. at 405 (citing Feuchtenberge v. Williamson, Carroll & Saunders, 137
Va. 578, 120 S.E. 257 (1923); Carter v. Keeton & Coleman, 112 Va. 307, 71 S.E. 554
(1911); Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. Main Line Realty Corp., 112 Va. 7, 70 S.E. 536
(1911)).
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the claimants were limited to lien claims against the tenant's lea-
sehold interest only.17
A defective affidavit led to invalidation of a mechanic's lien in
Artitech, Inc. v. Naser.18 In that case, a corporation filed a lien in
which the memorandum and the requisite affidavit identified the
claimant as the corporation itself.19 The person signing the affi-
davit, however, failed to confirm that he had any authority to ex-
ecute the memorandum on behalf of the corporation. 20 The court
refused to allow the plaintiff to amend the affidavit over a year
later and dismissed the suit.21
Finally, the trial court in DLB, Inc. v. United Golf, Inc., demon-
strated a more tolerant view regarding the contractor's filing de-
fects.22 In DLB, the contractor had filed its lien on only 225 of the
252 subdivision lots being improved, which led the owner to seek
dismissal of the liens.23 The trial court revised the lien claims by
dividing the total monetary amount sought by the actual number
of lots, and then permitting that pro rata amount to be placed on
the 225 lots identified in the memorandum. 24
B. Bond Claims
The question before the Supreme Court of Virginia in APAC-
Atlantic, Inc. v. General Insurance Co. of America was whether a
subcontractor on a public project could advance a payment bond
claim greater than one year after it last furnished construction
services. 25 The payment bond in question did not include a limi-
tation period nor did it refer to Virginia Code section 2.2-4341(C),
which sets forth the one-year limitation in the context of projects
17. Id.
18. No. CL07-5431, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 11, *2-3 (Cir. Ct. Feb. 19, 2008) (Fairfax
County).
19. Id. at*l-2.
20. Id. at *2.
21. Id. at *2-3.
22. No. CL07000099-00, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 25 (Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 2008) (Warren
County).
23. Id. at *1-2.
24. Id. at *2. The court in DLB relied upon West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First
Virginia Mortgage & Real Estate Investment Trust, 221 Va. 134, 141, 267 S.E.2d 149, 153
(1980), and First National Bank of Martinsville & Henry County v. Roy N. Ford Co., 219
Va. 942, 945, 252 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1979), as authority permitting judicial correction of the
lien.
25. 273 Va. 682, 684-85, 643 S.E.2d 483, 483-84 (2007).
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controlled by Virginia's Public Procurement Act (the "Public Pro-
curement Act").26 The contractor argued that the proper statute
of limitations, in the absence of an express limitation in the bond,
was the five-year, written-contract limitation set forth in Virginia
Code section 8.01-246(2).27 The court rejected this argument and
applied the shorter bond statute, set forth in the Public Procure-
ment Act, on the ground that the more specific statute, when a
statutory conflict exists, must govern.28
The untimely filing of a claim also doomed a second-tier sub-
contractor's Miller Act29 action in Datastaff Technology Group,
Inc. v. Centex Construction Co.30 In Datastaff, the subcontractor
also failed to file its claim within the one-year limitation period
mandated by the Miller Act.31 The subcontractor claimed that it
should be excused for its untimely filing under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel.32 In particular, the subcontractor contended
that the general contractor and its surety should be estopped
from raising a statute-of-limitations defense because they had led
the subcontractor to mistakenly believe it was a third-tier sub-
contractor, which under the Miller Act (and the payment bond
procured by the general contractor in compliance therewith) is
not afforded surety protection. 33 The district court rejected the
subcontractor's argument because the subcontractor had failed to
produce any credible evidence to show that it had been "lulled"
into inaction by anything the general contractor or its surety had
done.34 In fact, the court observed that the evidence demonstrat-
26. Id. at 686, 643 S.E.2d at 485 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4341(C) (Repl. Vol. 2008)
("Any action on a payment bond shall be brought within one year after the day on which
the person bringing such action last performed labor or last furnished or supplied mate-
rials.")).
27. Id. at 685, 686 n.1,643 S.E.2d at 484, 485 n..
28. Id. at 686 n.1, 643 S.E.2d at 485 n.1. Dicta in the APAC-Atlantic opinion, relying
on Reliance Insurance Co. v. Trane Co., 212 Va. 394, 395, 184 S.E.2d 817, 818 (1971), sug-
gests that a payment bond with an express limitation period greater than the one-year
statutory limit set forth in Virginia Code section 2.2-4341(C) would be enforceable. APAC-
Atlantic, 273 Va. at 685-86, 643 S.E.2d at 484-85.
29. See 40 U.S.C. § 3131 (2000).
30. 528 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D. Va. 2007).
31. Id. at 593 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(4) (2000)).
32. Id.
33. Id. Miller Act protection only extends to subcontractors (tier one) and their sub-
contractors (tier two). See 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(2).
34. Datastaff, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 595-97.
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ed the general contractor and its surety had done nothing to mis-
lead the subcontractor regarding its second-tier status.35
The subcontractor in Datastaff fared better on its quantum me-
ruit claim. The district court denied the general contractor sum-
mary judgment on that claim because the record was not suffi-
ciently developed on the issue of whether the contractor had been
unjustly enriched by the subcontractor's work. 36 A principal con-
sideration on that issue would be whether the general contractor
had paid the first-tier subcontractor for the second-tier subcon-
tractor's services. 37 In reaching this result, the court rejected the
general contractor's argument that the presence of an express
contract between it and the first-tier subcontractor precluded the
imposition of an implied obligation to pay the second-tier contrac-
tor. 38
Finally, in New Viasys Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hanover Insurance
Co., a contractor's failure to give timely notice of default of its
subcontractor, when the indemnity bond expressly demanded
such notice, doomed the contractor's bond claim. 39 In New Viasys,
a general contractor on a Virginia public project required its sub-
contractor to provide an indemnity bond guaranteeing its perfor-
mance. 40 The procured bond included a provision requiring that,
upon the principal's default, notice of the date and nature of the
default must be immediately delivered by certified mail to the su-
rety.41 The general contractor, however, did not provide such no-
35. Id. at 595. The court in Datastaff cited numerous federal cases holding that for
equitable estoppel to apply, the defendant must take some action upon which the plaintiff
reasonably relied in not pursuing the claim within the time required by the applicable sta-
tute of limitations. Id. at 593-94 (citing Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126,
1128-29 (4th Cir. 1987); U.S. ex rel. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fid. and Deposit Co. of N.Y.,
402 F.2d 893, 898 (4th Cir. 1968)). The court also rejected the subcontractor's alternative
constructive fraud claim on the ground that the same "reasonable reliance" requirement
applicable to equitable estoppel applied to constructive fraud. Id. at 597 (citing Prospect
Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 86, 515 S.E.2d 291, 297 (1999); Evaluation Research
Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 148, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1994)).
36. Id. at 599.
37. Id. at 598 (citing Kern v. Freed Co., 224 Va. 678, 681, 299 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1983)).
Another recent Virginia case identified another obvious ground for denying quantum me-
ruit recovery-the subcontractor's deficient performance precluded any obligation to pay.
See Davis Bros. Constr. Co. v. City of Richmond, 70 Va. Cir. 409, 411 (Cir. Ct. 2006)
(Richmond City).
38. Datastaff, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 598-99.
39. No. 2:06cv488, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17924, at *13 (E.D. Va. Mar. 12, 2007).
40. Id. at *1-2.
41. Id. at *3.
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tice for over a year after the initial default, instead permitting the
subcontractor to attempt to cure before it ultimately filed for
bankruptcy.42 The district court held that notice was a "condition
precedent" to the surety's obligation to honor the bond, that the
requirement for "immediate" notice in the bond meant "reasona-
ble" notice, and that the general contractor, who waited over a
year to give such notice, could not recover under the bond because
of its untimely notice.43
C. Statute of Limitations and Repose
The recent case of Birdneck Villas Condominium Ass'n v. Bird-
neck Villas, L.L.C., dealt with a number of interesting statute of
repose and limitations issues.44 In Birdneck, a condominium as-
sociation brought suit against the developer for a variety of build-
ing defects.45 The developer brought a third-party claim against
the contractor, which, in turn, brought fourth-party breach-of-
contract claims against various subcontractors.46 The subcontrac-
tor claims were filed more than five years after completion of the
project.47
One of the fourth-party subcontractors filed a special plea to
the general contractor's claim on the ground that the action was
barred by Virginia's five-year statute of repose, Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-250.48 The court rejected the special plea on the ground
that the statute of repose in Virginia only applies to tort claims
and consequently has no application to contract actions.49 In
reaching this result, the court relied upon numerous federal and
42. Id. at *3-4.
43. Id. at *9-10 (citing Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Courtney, 186 U.S. 342, 346-47
(1902)). The court in New Viasys also rejected the general contractor's equitable estoppel
argument because it produced no evidence to suggest that it had relied to its detriment on
any act by the surety. Id. at *16-17. The surety could not have so acted because it had no
knowledge of the default until the "reasonable" notice time period had already passed. Id.
44. 73 Va. Cir. 175 (Cir. Ct. 2007) (Virginia Beach City).
45. Id. at 175-76.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 176.
48. Id. Virginia Code section 8.01-250 bars any claim for "injury to property... or for
bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of... construction . .. more than five years
after the performance or furnishing of such services" giving rise to the claim. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-250 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
49. Birdneck, 73 Va. Cir. at 177-78.
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state cases that had similarly interpreted the repose statute.50 In
the process, the trial court rejected the fourth-party subcontrac-
tor's contention that the Supreme Court of Virginia's recent deci-
sion in Baker v. Poolservice Co.,51 required a different result.52
The court noted that the Baker case involved claims of negligence
and breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code
arising out of the death of an infant in a swimming pool-claims
that the court noted were essentially tort-based.53 Given that
Baker involved no contract claims, its holding was inapplicable to
the general contractor's contract claims in Birdneck.54
The court in Birdneck then considered a novel "relation back"
argument posed by the fourth-party subcontractor.55 Though the
opinion does not detail the subcontractor's relation-back conten-
tion, it does clearly hold that an amendment to a pleading involv-
ing the statute of repose will not "relate back" to the original
pleading under Virginia Code section 8.01-6.1 because that provi-
sion by its express terms only applies to the "statute of limita-
tions."56
D. Contribution and Indemnity Claims
The Birdneck case also addressed interesting issues of contri-
bution and indemnity. In its claims against its subcontractors,
the general contractor sought contribution and indemnity relative
to the developer's third-party claim. 57 The court rejected the con-
50. Id. at 177 (citing Delon Hampton & Assocs. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
943 F.2d 355, 362 (4th Cir. 1991); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works,
Inc., 722 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1983); Beckner v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 58 Va. Cir.
544, 554 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Roanoke)). For an argument that the statute of repose does apply
to contract claims, which has yet to be accepted by Virginia courts, see D. Stan Barnhill,
Does the Statute of Repose Apply to Contract Claims?, VA. LAW., Jan. 1993, at 29.
51. 272 Va. 677, 636 S.E.2d 360 (2006).
52. Birdneck, 73 Va. Cir. at 177.
53. Id. at 177-78.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 178.
56. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008) ("[A]n amend-
ment to a pleading changing or adding a claim or defense against a party relates back to
the date of the original pleading for purposes of the statute of limitations.")). The court in
Birdneck did grant another fourth-party defendant's statute of limitations plea because it
had not been sued within three years of when it last provided services under an oral con-
tract. Id. at 179. Oral contracts are governed by Virginia's three-year statute of limita-
tions. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(4) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
57. Birdneck, 73 Va. Cir. at 175-76.
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tribution claim because the contractor was seeking to pass all lia-
bility to its subcontractors instead of only a proportionate share of
a 'common burden... among other tortfeasors.58
The court also rejected the general contractor's indemnity
claim, noting that there was no express indemnity provision to re-
ly on because the general contractor did not have written agree-
ments with any of its subcontractors. 59 The court refused to find
an implied indemnity right arising out of the oral agreements. 60
Although the court observed that the Supreme Court of Virginia
had not yet addressed the issue, it noted that other courts had re-
fused to imply indemnity except where a 'special relationship"'
existed, not merely where a contractual relationship existed be-
tween a contractor and subcontractor. 61
Another interesting case raising questions about the reach of
contribution in the construction context is the recent federal case
of St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. Northside Electric Co.62 In
Northside, the insurer for a property owner brought an action
against the general contractor and electrical subcontractor for
damages arising from an electrical fire occurring at the owner's
facility. 63 The electrical subcontractor, in turn, brought a third-
party action against the manufacturer of the electrical equipment
involved in the fire.64 The equipment manufacturer proceeded to
file a fourth-party claim against the owner's building manager,
who had contractual duties to inspect and maintain the facility's
electrical system. 65
Based on these facts, the court in Northside rejected the contri-
bution claim. 66 It first cited to Virginia authority previously hold-
ing that 'a contribution plaintiff cannot recover from a contribu-
58. Id. at 179-80 (relying on Van Winckel v. Carter, 198 Va. 550, 555, 95 S.E.2d 148,
152 (1956)).
59. Id. at 180-81.
60. Id. at 181.
61. Id. at 180-81 (citing Transdulles Ctr., Inc. v. USX Corp., 976 F.2d 219, 228 (4th
Cir. 1992); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Corrpro Cos., 312 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (E.D. Va. 2004); Da-
cotah Mktg. & Research, L.L.C. v. Versatility, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 570, 580 (E.D. Va.
1998); Hanscome v. Perry, 542 A.2d 421, 426 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Kaleel Builders,
Inc. v. Ashby, 587 S.E.2d 470, 475 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)).
62. No. 3:07CV153-HEH, slip op. (E.D. Va. July 2, 2007).
63. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
64. Id., slip op. at 2.
65. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
66.' Id., slip op. at 6.
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tion defendant unless the injured party could have recovered
against the contribution defendant."'67 Applying this rule, the
court noted that the electrical subcontractor, as the "injured par-
ty," could not assert a common-law claim against the manage-
ment company upon which the electrical supplier could predicate
a contribution claim. 68 The court, therefore, dismissed the
claim.69
In W.R. Hall, Inc. v. Hampton Roads Sanitation District, the
Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the question of whether a
broad indemnification provision in a construction contract vi-
olated Virginia public policy. 70 The case arose when the public
owner entered into an indemnity agreement with a railroad rela-
tive to the public owner's installation of a sewer line on railroad
property. 71 The public owner then entered into a contract with a
utility contractor to install the sewer line, and included broad in-
demnity provisions in the agreement requiring the contractor to
hold the owner harmless from any claims brought against it as a
result of the contractor's performance of the work.72 During the
project, one of the contractor's employees was injured when a
train unexpectedly lunged forward and struck him.73 The em-
ployee brought suit against the railroad and the public body
promptly honored its indemnity obligation. 74 The public body
subsequently demanded indemnity from the contractor. 75 The
contractor refused, and the public owner brought a declaratory
judgment action to determine if the indemnity provisions in ques-
tion were enforceable. 76
The contractor argued that the obligation to indemnify a party
for personal injury arising out of negligence not caused by the in-
demnifying contractor or the party to be indemnified was against
public policy. 77 The court disagreed.78 The court found that an
67. Id., slip. op. at 4 (quoting Pierce v. Martin, 230 Va. 94, 96, 334 S.E.2d 576, 578
(1985)).
68. Id., slip op. at 4-6.
69. Id., slip. op. at 6.
70. 273 Va. 350, 352, 641 S.E.2d 472, 472-73 (2007).
71. Id. at 352, 641 S.E.2d at 473.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 353, 641 S.E.2d at 473.
76. Id. at 354, 641 S.E.2d at 474.
77. Id.
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owner can obtain broad indemnity from a contractor to protect it
from future personal injury claims that were not caused by its
negligence or the negligence of the indemnifying contractor. 79
E. Novel Tort Claims Arising out of the Construction Project
The saga of Britt Construction, Inc. v. Magazzine Clean L.L.C.,
discussed above, did not end with the contractor's loss in the Su-
preme Court of Virginia on its mechanic's lien claim. In a massive
assault against everyone that had caused it economic pain, the
contractor alleged various tort claims in a seven-count motion for
judgment against the owner that terminated it, the replacement
contractor, and the project architect.SO First, the contractor
brought actual and constructive fraud claims against the corpo-
rate owner and its principal for "misrepresent[ing] soils informa-
tion in connection with the project."81 These defendants demurred
on the ground that all duties for the project were governed by a
contract with an integration clause precluding consideration of
extraneous prior oral representations.S2 The court, however, dis-
missed the defendants' demurrer, noting that an integration
clause would not bar a claim for "fraud in the inducement."83
The contractor also asserted a claim of tortious interference
with a contract against the project architect, both corporately and
78. Id. at 356, 641 S.E.2d at 475. The court extended its holding in Estes Express
Lines, Inc. v. Chopper Express, Inc., which was decided the same day as Hall. See id. at
355, 641 S.E.2d at 475 (citing Estes, 273 Va. 358, 641 S.E.2d 476 (2007)). Estes established
that a contracting party as indemnitee can obtain indemnity from a non-negligent con-
tracting party for personal injuries caused by the imdemnitee's own negligence. See Estes,
273 Va. at 363-66, 641 S.E.2d at 478-79.
79. See Hall, 273 Va. at 356, 641 S.E.2d at 475. The court in Hall did not address the
impact of Virginia Code section 11-4.1, which declares any indemnity provision in a con-
struction contract seeking to shift liability from the sole negligent party to the contractor
as violative of public policy. See VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.1 (Repl. Vol. 2006). How can the in-
demnity provision in Hall be less offensive to public policy? Had the Estes case involved a
construction contract, the statute would have required the opposite result. In Hall, a con-
struction case, the court found that a provision shifting liability without regard to negli-
gence is acceptable public policy, while under the statute, indemnity conferred to a solely
negligent indemnitee (a narrower scope than the absolute indemnity in Hall) is not. What
does this say about the logic of public policy in Virginia?
80. Britt Constr., Inc. v. Magazzine Clean, L.L.C., 69 Va. Cir. 478, 478 (Cir. Ct. 2006)
(Loudoun County).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 478-79.
83. Id. (citing Colonial Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Schneider, 228 Va. 671, 325 S.E.2d 91
(1985) (explaining that a tort claim cannot be short circuited by reference to the contract)).
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against the individual architect who worked on the project. 84 The
trial court denied the project architect's demurrer, which con-
tended that as an agent for the owner, an architect could not tor-
tiously interfere with any contract.S5 In its ruling, the court em-
phasized that the construction contract required the architect to
decide issues on the project without "partiality," and that the con-
tractor claimed the architect failed to do so. 8 6
The court in Britt then considered the replacement contractor's
demurrer to the tortious interference claim.S7 The court rejected
an asserted "economic loss" defense because such defense does not
extend to intentional tort claims like tortious interference.8 8 The
court similarly rejected the replacement contractor's agency de-
fense that an agent cannot interfere with the contract of its prin-
cipal, emphasizing that an agent with a personal stake in the
matter at issue can be held liable.89 Finally, the court overruled
the common-law and statutory conspiracy claims, noting that the
alleged object of the conspiracy-to interfere with the contract be-
tween the owner and the plaintiff-was a cognizable claim 'even
when one of the alleged conspirators is a party to the contract."' 90
F. Design Professional Liability
The federal case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. J.A. Fielden Co.
breaks new ground in Virginia with respect to architect and engi-
neer liability.91 In Wal-Mart, a property owner sued its contrac-
tor, soils engineer, engineering firm, and its contractor's subcon-
84. Id. at 479.
85. Id. at 480.
86. Id. The court referenced a possible "privilege" argument the architect could have
made on the tortious interference claims without expanding on the issue. Id. Presumably,
the court is referring to case law recognizing an architect's qualified privilege that protects
for decisions made in "good faith." For a discussion of such qualified privilege, see general-
ly D. Stan Barnhill, Intentional Tort Liability and the Economic Loss Rule: Novel Theories
To Recover Damages Incurred on the Construction Project, VA. LAW., Oct. 1995, at 22.
87. Britt, 69 Va. Cir. at 480.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 480-81 (citing Ashco Int'l, Inc. v. Westmore Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 42 Va.
Cir. 427 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Fairfax County)).
90. Id. at 481 (quoting CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 28, 431
S.E.2d 277, 281 (1993)).
91. See 440 F. Supp. 2d 523 (W.D. Va. 2006).
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tractors on various claims arising out of a slope failure on the
owner's commercial property. 92
Among the claims asserted against the soils engineer and engi-
neering firm were claims for breach of implied and express war-
ranties.93 In a truly remarkable holding, the district court first
concluded that the owner had stated an express warranty claim
against the project engineer. 94 As precedent, the court relied
upon a recent case from the Supreme Court of Virginia involving
the sale of equipment in which an equipment manufacturer ex-
pressly warranted that the equipment it was supplying to the
owner would be 'free of defects in design, workmanship, and ma-
terial."' 95 According to the court, the engineer's assumption of the
contractual obligation to provide certain prescribed civil engineer-
ing design services for the project 'as may be required"' consti-
tuted a warranty to provide an "appropriate" design, which prom-
ise constituted an express warranty.96 The district court's
decision, however, failed to note that, unlike the equipment sup-
plier in the case it cited, the engineer did not expressly warrant
anything. The Supreme Court of Virginia has made clear, in a
case not cited by the Western District in Wal-Mart, that a profes-
sional's promise to provide design services is a promise only to do
so consistent with the applicable standard of care, rather than a
warranty of perfect performance. 97
The district court adopted the same problematic approach in
refusing to dismiss the owner's implied warranty claim against
the soils engineer and project engineer. The court cited to estab-
lished case law involving the implied warranty that contractors
give owners in Virginia and inferred that professional engineers
confer the same warranty.98 Again, the district court failed to ap-
preciate the different treatment under Virginia law for contrac-
92. Id. at 525.
93. Id.
94. Id at 525-26.
95. Id. (quoting Hubbard v. Dresser, Inc., 271 Va. 117, 123-24, 624 S.E.2d 1, 4
(2006)).
96. Id. at 526.
97. See Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 195 Va. 431, 442-43, 78 S.E.2d 901, 907 (1953)
(holding that an architect is obligated to exercise reasonable care, not guarantee a perfect
plan or a satisfactory result).
98. Wal-Mart, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 527 (citing Goddard v. Protective Life Corp., 82 F.
Supp. 2d 545, 556 (E.D. Va. 2000); Willner v. Woodward, 201 Va. 104, 108, 109 S.E.2d 132,
134 (1959); Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887, 901, 59 S.E.2d 78, 84 (1950)).
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tors, who can be expected to follow the design documents without
requiring the exercise of professional judgment, and design pro-
fessionals, whose service is exclusively conveyed through the ex-
ercise of such judgment. 99 Contrary to the district court's holding,
no Virginia appellate court has recognized that a design profes-
sional confers any implied warranty as part of its agreement to
provide professional design services.100
Finally, the district court in Wal-Mart correctly rejected the
owner's construction fraud claim on the ground that the promises
made constituted promises about future performance and not
statements of fact that were false when made.101
The design professional in Green v. Highlander fared better
than the unfortunate design professionals in Wal-Mart.102 In
Green, the plaintiff, who had been injured in a parking lot,
brought a negligence action against the parking lot designer,
among others.103 The trial court granted the design firm's demur-
rer, succinctly stating that the plaintiff had failed to produce a
single case holding that "a design professional [owed] a duty to an
invitee of a premises it designed to protect the invitee from injury
caused by a third party".104
G. Arbitration
The Supreme Court of Virginia provided additional clarity on
the authority Of the arbitrator to decide important issues of law in
BBF, Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc. 105 In BBF, the arbitrator
99. Compare Mann, 190 Va. at 901, 59 S.E.2d at 84 (articulating the role of a contrac-
tor), with Surf Realty, 195 Va. at 442-43, 78 S.E.2d at 907 (describing the service provided
by an architect). The district court in Wal-Mart actually cited Mann as authority for im-
posing a warranty obligation on the design professionals. See Wal-Mart, 440 F. Supp. 2d at
527 (citing Mann, 190 Va. at 901, 59 S.E.2d at 84). Mann, however, dealt with contractor
liability under an implied warranty of workmanship and not whether a design profession-
al confers an implied warranty in the performance of its services. See Mann, 190 Va. at
901-02, 59 S.E.2d at 84-85.
100. For a circuit court decision finding that design professionals give implied warran-
ties, also without discussing Surf Realty Corp. or any other controlling authority, see Cap-
ital One v. CSI Engineering, CL 0 1-728, slip op. at 3 (Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2004) (Henrico Coun-
ty).
101. Wal-Mart, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (citing Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848
F.2d 50, 53 (4th Cir. 1988)).
102. No. CL06-5689, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 190 (Cir. Ct. Oct. 23, 2007) (Richmond City).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id. at *1-2.
105. 274 Va. 326, 645 S.E.2d 467 (2007).
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awarded liquidated damages to the plaintiff, Alstom U.S., for the
breach of its supplier, BBF.106 BBF challenged the arbitration
award on the ground that Alstom U.S. had not actually suffered
damages and thus an award of liquidated damages would be vio-
lative of Virginia's public policy.107
The court rejected BBF's challenge.10 8 It noted that Virginia's
Arbitration Act provides only five grounds for judicial vacation of
an arbitration award: (1) fraud, (2) evident partiality by the arbi-
trator, (3) exercise of powers by the arbitrator not conferred in the
arbitration agreement, (4) prejudicial exclusion of evidence or re-
fusal to postpone the hearing for good cause by the arbitrator, or
(5) the absence of an arbitration agreement.109 The court further
observed that in the mid- 1980s the General Assembly had deleted
a provision of the Arbitration Act that preserved the power of the
courts to exercise equity in evaluating arbitration awards.11O As a
result, Virginia's courts no longer possessed the power to apply
equitable principles to arbitration awards.111 Without such pow-
er, the trial court could not consider whether the arbitrator's
award of liquidated damages to Alstom U.S., despite the fact that
it suffered no actual damages, violated public policy.11 2
H. Procedural Roadblocks to Contractor Claims on Public
Projects
This review of recent judicial decisions ends with a discussion
of two nightmarish cases-at least from the contractor view-
point-decided in the context of public projects.11 3 First, in Mod-
106. Id. at 328, 645 S.E.2d at 468.
107. Id. at 329, 645 S.E.2d at 468-69.
108. Id. at 331, 645 S.E.2d at 470.
109. Id. at 330, 645 S.E.2d at 469 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.010 (Repl. Vol. 2007
& Supp. 2008)).
110. Id. at 331, 645 S.E.2d at 469 (citing Lackman v. Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc.,
266 Va. 20, 26, 580 S.E.2d 818, 822 (2003)).
111. See id.
112. Id. at 331, 645 S.E.2d at 470.
113. Brief mention should also be made of another public procurement case, Davis
Bros. Constr. Co. v. City of Richmond, 70 Va. Cir. 409 (Cir. Ct. 2006) (Richmond City). In
Davis, the trial court denied a contractor recovery on an extra work claim for which the
contractor had received no prior written approval from the public body before performing
the work, as required by both city ordinance and Virginia Code section 2.2-4309 of the
Public Procurement Act. Id. at 409-11 (citing RICHMOND, VA., CODE § 74-63 (2004); VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-4309 (Repl. Vol. 2008)). Compare this result with two recent cases involv-
ing private parties where the courts reached the opposite result based on the common law,
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ern Continental South v. Fairfax County Water Authority, the
Circuit Court of Fairfax County rejected a contractor's extra work
claim against a public owner, a county water authority. 114 The
core factual issue in the case was whether the contract documents
called for a particular kind of valve to be installed in a water
treatment plant.115 The court recognized the conflict, as well as
the fact that the project engineer had approved, without objec-
tion, four of the contractor's shop drawings, which included the
valve that the contractor maintained was called for in the con-
tract documents.116 Nevertheless, the court swept aside these
four approvals by reference to a contract provision denying any
right to rely on shop drawing approvals that varied from the re-
quirements of the plans and specifications.117 The court further
relied on the contract provision that required the contractor to
review the design and report any errors or omissions set forth
therein or otherwise be responsible for damages arising out of its
failure to do so. 118 The contractor's failure to discover the project
engineer's errors in the original plans, and its later reliance on
the engineer's approval of its shop drawings based on its under-
standing of the design, thus required the contractor to absorb the
entire cost of replacing the installed valve with the purportedly
intended valve. 119
which continues to recognize that parties to a contract can, by their course of dealings,
modify the "prior written consent" requirement to compensable extra work claims. See
Ballou Justice Upton Architects v. T. C. Midatlantic Dev., Inc., No. CL06-6176 (Cir. Ct.
Nov. 20, 2007) (Richmond City); Commonwealth Home Bldg. Corp. v. Lewis, No.
CH05000145-00 (Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 2007) (Hanover County).
114. 70 Va. Cir. 172, 202 (Cir. Ct. 2006) (Fairfax County).
115. Id. at 174.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 176-77.
118. Id. The contract provision in question stated:
Contractor shall verify all dimensions, quantities, and details shown on the
Drawings and Supplemental Drawings, equipment, material, finishes, and
other such listings or other data received from the Engineer, and shall notify
him of all errors, omissions, conflicts, and discrepancies. This shall not relieve
the Contractor of full responsibility for unsatisfactory Work, faulty construc-
tion, or improper operation resulting therefrom, or from rectifying such con-
ditions at his own expense. He shall not be allowed to take advantage of any
errors or omissions .... The Contractor shall assume all responsibility for
the making of estimates of the size, kind, and quality of materials and
equipment included in work to be done under the contract.
Id. at 176.
119. Id. at 184-85. The court in Modern Continental relied on D.C. McClain, Inc. v. Ar-
lington County, 249 Va. 131, 138-39, 452 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1995), for the proposition that
"the ultimate responsibility" for the design errors rested with the contractor and that shop
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In addition to its novel, design-shifting ground for denying the
contractor's extra claim, the court in Modern Continental also de-
nied the claim on more conventional notice grounds. The contract
in question required the contractor to give at least a five-day
written notice of any extra work claim.120 In addition, the Public
Procurement Act required notice of such claim to be given at the
time the contractor begins the work upon which the claim will be
based.121 The contractor, however, did not give such notice for
almost nine months after beginning the work for which it would
later seek extra compensation. 12 2 Finding none of the contractor's
explanations for failing to give notice persuasive, the court re-
jected the claim for notice defects as well.123
Although it was a pyrrhic victory, the contractor did fare better
on the final argument advanced by the public body to deny its
contract claim. The contract in question included a requirement
that the contractor give the public owner a written notice of pro-
test within five days of receiving the owner's final decision on its
claim.124 The contractor contended that this provision violated
Virginia Code section 2.2-4363(E), which stipulates that the con-
tractor must appeal a public owner's final decision on a claim
within six months of that decision.125 The court agreed with the
contractor, finding that the protest provision impermissibly
drawing approval did not absolve the contractor of that responsibility. Modern Cont'l, 70
Va. Cir. at 182-83. The difficulty, in relying on McClain, however, is that McClain in-
volved a contractor's obligation to verify the dimensions shown on the plans in the field
prior to undertaking its work. See McClain, 249 Va. at 138-39, 452 S.E.2d at 663. The
contractor in McClain was not required to go beyond field measurement verification and
conduct a complete review of the design to ensure it was error-free. See id. The Modern
Continental case, in contrast, permitted the project designer and owner to shift the entire
design responsibility to a contractor, not licensed or trained as a engineer. See Modern
Cont'l, 70 Va. Cir. at 176. Neither the McClain case nor any other prior case in Virginia
has permitted such a dramatic shift of professional responsibility to non-professionals. Are
contractors in the wake of Modern Continental required to hire their own professional en-
gineers to undertake a comprehensive design review before they initiate construction
when they face similar onerous contract terms?
120. Modern Cont'l, 70 Va. Cir. at 187.
121. Id. at 186 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4363 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
122. Id. at 187.
123. Id. at 190. This article will not address the arguments the contractor unsuccess-
fully advanced to excuse its notice omission as they are unique to that case and largely
ignored the mandate in Virginia Code section 2.2-4363.
124. Id. at 191.
125. Id. The provision in question states: 'The decision of the public body shall be final
and conclusive unless the contractor appeals within six months of the date of the final de-
cision on the claim by the public body." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4363(E) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
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sought to abrogate the contractor's right to rely on the six-month
statute of limitation imposed in the Public Procurement Act.126
The court further found that even if the protest provision did not
violate the Public Procurement Act, it ran afoul of the Dillon Rule
which precludes counties from exercising powers not expressly
conferred by statute. 127 Finally, the court found that Virginia
Code section 2.2-4363(B), which grants public bodies the right to
fashion their own administrative procedures for processing
claims, did not grant the power to create "post-claim and pre-
appeal" hurdles to a contractor's appeal rights under section 2.2-
4363(E).128
The contractor in Modern Continental subsequently moved for
rehearing on the design-shifting and notice decisions by the trial
court. 129 The trial court refused to reconsider its prior notice deci-
sion, but did address its earlier design-shifting decision. It ac-
knowledged that, according to the contractor, its prior decision ef-
fectively imposed an 'unlimited obligation"' upon the contractor
to identify every design error in the contract documents. 130 It fur-
ther acknowledged that substantial authority existed for the
proposition that an owner who obligates a contractor to build a
project according to plans and specifications cannot shift the bur-
den to the contractor for design defects through contract clauses
requiring the contractor to check the plans for accuracy. 131 The
trial court, however, found an exception in Virginia law to this
basic proposition where the general contractor provides an ex-
press warranty or guarantee that the plans and specifications are
126. Modern Cont'l, 70 Va. Cir. at 196 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4363(E) (Repl. Vol.
2008)).
127. Id. The Dillon Rule holds that counties, such as the plaintiff in Modern Continen-
tal, only possess the powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied there-
from, and those that are essential and indispensable."' Id. (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v.
Countryside Invest. Co., 258 Va. 497, 503, 522 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1999)).
128. Id. at 198 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4363(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
129. See Modern Cont'l South v. Fairfax County Water Auth. (Modern Cont'l II), 72 Va.
Cir. 268, 268 (Cir. Ct. 2006) (Fairfax County).
130. Id. at 268-69.
131. Id. at 269-70. The court discussed at length the Supreme Court of the United
States watershed case United States v. Spearin, which held that "a contractor who is con-
tractually bound to build according to plans and specifications proposed by the owner will
not be responsible for consequences arising from defects in such plans and specifications."
248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918). The court recognized that this "Spearin Doctrine" had been ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Modern Cont'l II, 72 Va. Cir. at 271 (citing
Southgate v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 147 Va. 554, 563-64, 137 S.E. 485, 487-88 (1927)).
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without defect.132 The trial court found the contractual duty im-
posed on the contractor to "verify all .. details shown on the
drawings" and to "notify [the engineer] of all errors, omissions,
conflicts, and discrepancies" constituted an implied warranty that
the design was free from error. 133 Based on this logic, the trial
court reaffirmed its earlier decision holding the contractor liable
for the costs incurred as a result of the design error. 134
In Dynasty Construction v. County Board of Arlington, the con-
tractor sought to advance wrongful termination claims under the
public owner's "Purchasing Resolution," as incorporated into the
contract documents.135 That resolution required the contractor to
submit its claim first to the county manager; if failing there, to
submit the claim to the county board of supervisors; and if failing
there, to appeal to the circuit court. 136 The resolution incorpo-
rated by reference the claim procedures set forth in Virginia Code
sections 15.1-1246 through 15.1-1248.137
Consistent with the resolution, the contractor proceeded with-
out success before the county manager and board of supervi-
sors. 138 It then requested the county clerk, as called for in section
15.2-1246, to set the amount of the appeal bond, which the clerk
incredibly set at $1 million, even though the county itself had no
affirmative claim requiring a bond of such excessive amount.139
The contractor wrote the clerk protesting such an absurd bond to
cover the costs of the appeal, but the clerk did not respond. 140 The
contractor then proceeded with the appeal without filing the
132. Modern Cont'l II, 72 Va. Cir. at 271 (citing Worley Bros. Co. v. Marus Marble &
Tile Co., 209 Va. 136, 142, 161 S.E.2d 796, 801 (1968); Greater Richmond Civic Rec., Inc.
v. A.H. Ewing's Sons, Inc., 200 Va. 593, 595, 106 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1959)).
133. Id. at 272 (internal quotation omitted). The trial court concluded its opinion with a
discussion of the differences between the facts before it and in Spearin that is difficult to
discern. See id. It appears the court's position was that even under Spearin a contractor
has a duty to deal with reasonably foreseeable errors in the plans, and the contractor in
Modern Continental failed to meet this duty. See id. There is, however, no such reasonable
foreseeability discussion in Spearin to support such interpretation.
134. See id.
135. 73 Va. Cir. 428, 428-29 (Cir. Ct. 2007) (Arlington County).
136. Id. at 432.
137. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-1246 to -1248 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
138. Dynasty, 73 Va. Cir. at 429.
139. See id. How could any clerk in the proper exercise of his or her powers set a one-
million-dollar bond for an appeal where the claimant lost on its affirmative monetary
claim, the defendant had no affirmative claim, and the bond's purpose was to secure mere
payment of "costs"?
140. Id.
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bond.141 The county challenged the appeal on the ground that no
appeal could proceed without the required bond. 142
The trial court first considered the contractor's due process ar-
gument to the bond requirement. The court cited section 15.2-
1246 which, as incorporated in the resolution, required the post-
ing of the bond to maintain an appeal.143 The court held that this
requirement was jurisdictional and the contractor's failure to file
the bond doomed the appeal.144 In reaching this result, the court
observed that the contractor had the option of filing the bond and
thereafter seeking from the court a ruling that it was exces-
sive.145 Alternatively, the contractor could challenge the exces-
siveness of the bond in the trial court during the nine-day period
that ran from when the clerk set the bond amount to when the
appeal had to be filed according to the thirty-day limit in section
15.2-1246.146 The contractor's failure to do either deprived the
trial court of jurisdiction to hear its appeal. 147
The trial court in Dynasty also rejected the contractor's due
process challenge to the appellate process afforded under the res-
olution.148 The contractor contended that it was denied an admin-
istrative appeal before a "disinterested person or panel" as re-
quired by Virginia Code section 2.2-4365,149 and that the bond
requirement violated the Public Procurement Act. 150 In response,
141. Id. at 429-30.
142. Id. at 430.
143. Id. Virginia Code section 15.2-1246 states in pertinent part:
[A final decision] may be appealed by serving written notice on the clerk of
the governing body and executing a bond to the county, with sufficient surety
to be approved by the clerk of the governing body, with condition for the
faithful prosecution of such appeal, and the payment of all costs imposed on
the appellant by the court.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1246 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
144. Dynasty, 73 Va. Cir. at 431.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 432.
149. Id. at 431. Virginia Code section 2.2-4365 permits a public body to establish in the
contract "an administrative procedure" to permit claims to be heard by a "disinterested
person or panel" not comprised of an employee of the public body, as opposed to being
heard de novo in the circuit court. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4365 (Repl. Vol. 2008). The losing
party may then appeal to the circuit court, which then performs a limited review as to
whether the findings of fact were "fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious," or "grossly errone-
ous." Id.
150. Dynasty, 73 Va. Cir. at 431. The Public Procurement Act, in contrast to Virginia
Code section 15.2-1246, does not require a bond in order to prosecute an appeal of a final
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the court found that the court itself could constitute the disinte-
rested person for the administrative procedure for hearing ap-
peals under the Public Procurement Act,151 and that the county
was exempt from the Public Procurement Act by virtue of Virgin-
ia Code section 2.2-4343(A)(10).152
The Dynasty case represents the low watermark for the fair
treatment of claimants on public projects in Virginia. The panoply
of rights, set forth in the Public Procurement Act, requiring disin-
terested fact-finders and an uninhibited right to appeal adverse
decisions, were denied the Dynasty contractor.
III. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES REFLECTED IN THE NEW AIA
CONTRACTS
For decades the AIA has been the source of the most commonly
used construction contracts in America. 153 The two most popular
contracts have been the A101 "Standard Form of Agreement Be-
tween Owner and Contractor (Stipulated Sum)" (the "A101"), and
the B141 "Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Architect" (the "B141").154 Both agreements have contemplated
decision of a public body. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4363 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
151. Dynasty, 73 Va. Cir. at 432. In the judgment of the author, the court erred in
equating itself with a "disinterested person or panel," as required by Virginia Code section
2.2-4365. Paragraph B of that very provision grants the party aggrieved by the final deci-
sion of the "administrative proceeding before a disinterested person or panel" the right to
judicial review in the circuit court if an action is filed within thirty days of the decision.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4365(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008). How could the trial court in Dynasty be
both the administrative "disinterested person or panel" and the reviewing court? It could
not.
152. Dynasty, 73 Va. Cir. at 432. Virginia Code section 2.2-4343(A)(10) permits local
governments to opt out of the Public Procurement Act and fashion their own procurement
procedures as long as they comply with the requirements of Virginia Code section 2.2-
4300. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4343(A)(10) (Repl. Vol. 2008). Section 2.2-4300 requires
that "all procurement procedures be conducted in a fair and impartial manner with avoid-
ance of any impropriety or appearance of impropriety." Id. § 2.2-4300 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
How can a system that establishes an administrative hearing procedure decided only by
county employees and board members be "fair and impartial" when it permits the county's
clerk to fix prohibitive bond requirements? It cannot, and it is difficult to discern how the
trial court could find that the county's procedures in Dynasty passed muster under these
mandates.
153. The AIA first promulgated an owner/contractor agreement in 1888. See SUZANNE
H. HARNESS, AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS 2007 REVISIONS TO ALA CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 5
(2007) [hereinafter HARNESS], available at http://www.aiacv.org/aiacontractdocumentrevi
sions2007.pdf.
154. Until 1997, the B141 was a single document. In that year, the AIA divided it into
a Part 1 and Part 2. Compare AIA B141(1)-1997, and AIA B141(2)-1997, with AIA B141-
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their use in conjunction with a set of additional contract terms set
forth in the AIA's A201 "General Conditions of the Contract for
Construction" (the "A201").155
Every ten years, the AIA has issued a revised B141 and
A101/A201. The AIA's refusal to continue issuing prior versions of
its copyrighted contracts after the issuance of a revised set forces
a reluctant construction industry to adopt immediately the re-
vised versions.
In late 2007, the AIA published its most recent set of generic
construction contracts. The AIA intends the standard Own-
er/Contractor Agreement and incorporated General Conditions to
be the A101/A201. For the first time, however, the AIA is depart-
ing from treating the B141 as the primary Owner/Architect
Agreement. In its place the AIA has issued the B101 "Standard
Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect" (the
"B101").156 This article will focus on some of the more significant
1987. In this article, Part 1 of the 1997 B141 will be cited as B141(1) and Part 2 as
B141(2).
155. The AIA published its first set of general conditions in 1911. The 2007 version
constitutes the AIA's sixteenth revision of that document. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS,
AIA DOCUMENT COMMENTARY, A201 2007 GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR
CONSTRUCTION 1 (2007). The AIA also publishes a number of other form contracts such as
the A102 and A103, which deal with "cost plus" payment schemes. These are used in situ-
ations that depart from the "design/bidlbuild" arrangement characterizing most construc-
tion projects. See AIA 102-2007; AIA 103-2007. Additionally, the AIA publishes numerous
other contracts to govern a wide range of circumstances or relationships, including the
A401 (Contractor/Subcontractor agreement) and the C401 (Architect/Consultant agree-
ment). See AIA A401-1997; AIA C401-2007. This article will not address recent or antic-
ipated changes to these less general agreements, although to the extent that they incorpo-
rate the A201 general conditions, which most do, the 2007 changes to the A201 will be
reflected in changes to these other form contracts as well.
156. See AIA B101-2007. In this author's opinion, the AIA retired the B141 in 2007 be-
cause of the construction industry's overall dissatisfaction with the 1997 version. The 1997
B141, with its bifurcated structure, was unnecessarily complicated and unwieldy. In re-
sponse, many architectural firms eschewed its use, selecting instead the 1997 version of
the B151 "Abbreviated Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect" (the
"B151") as a more satisfactory substitute. The AIA apparently got the message as the
"platform" for the B101 in 2007 is the 1997 version of the B151. See AIA B151-1997. Not
willing to abandon completely its mistake, the AA in 2007 created separate successor
documents for the B141-the B102 "Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Architect Without a Predefined Scope of Architect's Services" (the "B102") and the B201
"Standard Form of Architect's Services: Design and Construction Contract Administra-
tion" (the "B201"). See AIA B102-2007; AIA B201-2007. This author predicts that the 2007
B102[B201 will itself suffer a similar fate as the 1997 B141, and that the B101 will be the
overwhelming contract of choice for architects and owners over the next decade. Neverthe-
less, this article will address not only the material differences between the 1997 B151 and
2007 B101, but also the differences between the 1997 B141(l) and (2) and the 2007
B102/201. Hopefully, in ten years the AIA will likewise abandon the B102/201 Agreement
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changes likely to impact the construction industry following the
AIA's issuance of the revised A101/A201 and the newly issued
B101.157
A. Dispute Resolution: The "Initial Decision Maker"
The 1997 version of the A201, like multiple earlier versions,
designated the Architect as the entity responsible for initially de-
ciding the merits of disputes between the Owner and Contractor.
Specifically, section 4.3.2 of the 1997 A201 required the Owner or
Contractor to give the other party and the Architect written no-
tice of any claim within twenty-one days of its occurrence.1 58 The-
reafter, the Architect would have ten days under section 4.4.2 to
take action on the claim, which could include rejecting or accept-
ing it, suggesting a compromise, asking for additional informa-
tion, or informing the parties that no decision would be forthcom-
ing.159 Section 4.2.12 mandated that the Architect decide the
claim in writing, in good faith, and without partiality.160 Finally,
section 4.4.6 conferred on the Architect the authority to designate
its decision final, and to impose a thirty-day time limit on either
party's right to initiate mediation (to be followed by arbitration, if
unsuccessful).161 The failure to invoke mediation within the spe-
cified time frame rendered the Architect's decision final and bind-
ing.162
The 2007 A101/A201 has created an alternative to the Archi-
tect's traditional decision-making responsibility. New section
15.1.2 of the A201 states that notice of claims must now be sub-
mitted to the "Initial Decision Maker" ("IDM") for an initial deci-
sion.163 Section 15.2.1 further designates the Architect as the de-
and continue forward with a single Owner/Architect Agreement, thereby reinstating a
clarity that has been missing since 1997.
157. In keeping with the practice in the AIA form contracts themselves, and in disre-
gard with what would be proper grammar otherwise, this article capitalizes certain terms
including "Owner," "Contractor," "Subcontractor," "Architect," and "Agreement."
158. AIA A201-1997 § 4.3.2.
159. Id. § 4.4.2.
160. Id. § 4.2.12.
161. Id. § 4.4.6.
162. Id.
163. AIA A201-2007 § 15.1.2.
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fault IDM if the Owner and Contractor do not decide in the con-
tract to vest that authority elsewhere.i 64
The new IDM concept raises a number of significant issues.
First, the provision requires the Contractor to agree affirmatively
with the IDM,165 whereas the previous form contract provided no
options to the Architect fulfilling the initial decision maker role.
Will the AIA's placement of the IDM issue squarely before the
parties for decision during contract negotiations now eliminate a
traditional argument that Contractors have made regarding the
Architect's decision making activities-that the Architect cannot
decide disputes fairly because of its natural allegiance to the
Owner? With the 2007 IDM revision, Contractors who agree to
use the Architect as the IDM during negotiations will now likely
face the retort, when disputes later arise, that the person making
the initial claim decisions is precisely the person they intentional-
ly selected for that role in their pre-contract consultation with
their Owners.
Second, the IDM change creates a conflict between the Archi-
tect and IDM when the IDM is someone other than the Architect.
Sections 4.2.11 and 4.2.12 of both the 1997 and 2007 A201 vest
the Architect with the authority to "interpret and decide matters
concerning performance under, and requirements of, the Contract
Documents."166 How is this interpretation/decision making au-
thority to mesh with the separate IDM's authority to decide
claims? Is the IDM to defer to the Architect's prior "interpreta-
tions and decisions," promulgated pursuant to these sections, or
can the IDM veto them? The 2007 A201 provides no answer. 167
Third, the revised A201 fails to create a standard of care to go-
vern the IDM's conduct and liability when the IDM is not the
Architect. The obligation to show no partiality and the protection
conferred on the Architect for decisions made in "good faith" re-
main in the 2007 A201.168 The applicable provision, however, ap-
164. Id. § 15.2.1.
165. See id.
166. AIA A201-2007 §§ 4.2.11, 4.2.12; AIA A201-1997 §§ 4.2.11, 4.2.12.
167. Section 15.1.3 of the 2007 A201 does state that the "Architect will prepare Change
Orders and issue Certificates for Payment in accordance with the decisions of the [IDM]."
AIA A201-2007 § 15.1.3 (emphasis added). That statement, however, does not address the
supremacy, or lack thereof, of the Architect's "interpretations and decisions."
168. AIA A201-2007 § 4.2.12.
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plies only to the Architect's "interpretations and decisions."169
There is no similar provision in the contract addressing these is-
sues when the IDM is someone other than the Architect, an ap-
parent oversight by the AIA. Will this omission lead courts to im-
pose a different standard of care on non-Architect IDMs, or might
the courts fashion some form of quasi-judicial immunity to deal
with the AIA's omission? Only time will tell.
Fourth, it is unclear whether Owners and Contractors, who
elect to utilize someone other than the Architect as the IDM, will
get their money's worth. Under the 1997 A201, the Architect per-
formed the IDM role as a basic service to the Owner.17o Under
the 2007 documents, the Architect, when designated as the IDM,
still performs this role as a basic service to the Owner.171 Thus,
under either version, neither the Owner nor the Contractor is re-
quired to make any special payments for the IDM service. The
2007 A201, however, is silent on who is to pay for the non-
Architect IDM service, a curious omission given that the docu-
ment, like its predecessors, imposes an equal-share obligation on
the Owner and Contractor to pay for any mediator that may later
be designated.17 2 Why did the AIA not expressly impose a similar
cost-saving obligation to fund a non-Architect IDM?173
Finally, assuming that the payment issue is resolved, the non-
Architect IDM provision still begs a crucial question: Why would
the parties want to retain a third party, who has no ongoing in-
volvement on the Project, to make important initial decisions re-
garding their claims? A non-Architect IDM would not possess the
factual understanding of the often complicated issues giving rise
to disputes on a construction project, which the Architect, owing
169. Id.
170. See AIA A201-1997 §§ 4.2.11-.12; see also AIA B141(2)-1997 §§ 2.6.2.5-.6.1.9; AIA
B151-2007 §§ 2.6.15-17.
171. See AIA A201-2007 §§ 4.2.11-12, 15.2.1; see also AIA B101-2007 §§ 3.6.2-.5; AIA
B201-2007 §§ 2.6.2.3-.5.
172. Compare AIA A201-2007 §§ 15.3.2, 15.3.3, 15.3.7, with AIA A201-2007 § 4.5.2.
173. While the AIA is silent on the payment obligation for the non-Architect IDM, the
2007 B101 and B201 expressly state that the Architect is entitled to "Additional Service"
compensation from the Owner for assisting the non-Architect IDM. See AIA B101-2007 §
4.3.1.11; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.11. Thus, the Owner could find itself paying its Architect to
assist the non-Architect IDM, and then being required to pay some portion of the IDM's
fee as well. Further, if the parties do not specify terms of payment in a rider to the con-
tract during negotiations, the very issue of IDM payment could become the first dispute to
be decided by the non-Architect IDM if the parties are at odds in a bitter dispute and can-
not agree to a shared payment scheme.
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to the Architect's ongoing involvement, would already possess. A
non-Architect IDM would often need considerable time to acquire
the facts necessary to make knowledgeable, reasoned decisions.
That effort would likely be expensive and invite rushed, errone-
ous decisions given the ten-day period set aside for such delibera-
tion in section 15.2.2.174
Based on the foregoing questions, it is likely that the IDM
changes to the 2007 A201 will result in the Architect's continued
performance of the IDM role by virtue of its default status. One
possible alternative is that by focusing the parties on the IDM is-
sue, the AIA may have inadvertently pushed Owners and Con-
tractors to strike all IDM provisions from their contracts, thereby
permitting the parties to move their disputes directly into media-
tion (followed, if unsuccessful, by arbitration or litigation) without
first satisfying any IDM condition precedent. In this author's opi-
nion, this is an attractive alternative.
B. Dispute Resolution: Finality of the 1DM Decision
As noted, the 1997 A201 specified that the Architect's decision
on claims became final if the aggrieved party did not pursue med-
iation within thirty days of the Architect's written decision impos-
ing that deadline.175 The 2007 A201 has replaced this provision
with two new sections: 15.2.6 and 15.2.6.1. These sections permit
the invocation of mediation at any time after the IDM's decision
(with no deadline other than the statute of limitations), unless
one of the parties, within thirty days of the initial decision, de-
mands that the other party initiate mediation.17 6 Upon such de-
mand, the other party has sixty days from the decision to invoke
mediation, with failure to do so rendering the decision final and
binding. 177
These amendments are an improvement over the 1997 contract
language, which had the effect of forcing the parties into media-
174. See AIA A201-2007 § 15.2.2. Section 15.2.2 of the 2007 A201 does include some
"safety valves" which permit the IDM to extend the time of deliberation to gather addi-
tional facts and retain input from consultants. See id. That safety value would likely be
invoked by a conscientious IDM, which will delay the initial decision and increase the
transactional cost of securing such decision.
175. See AlA A201-1997 § 4.4.1.
176. SeeAIAA201-2007 §§ 15.2.6, 15.2.6.1.
177. Id.
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tion because of a thirty-day deadline imposed by the Architect,
even when they would have preferred to postpone such proceed-
ings until later, possibly to the end of the Project.178 The 2007
amendments now put that timing issue squarely within the con-
trol of the Owner and Contractor, where it belongs.
C. Dispute Resolution: Consolidation /Joinder
Section 4.6.4 of the 1997 A201, as well as section 1.3.5.4 of the
1997 B141(1) and section 7.2.4 of the 1997 B151, previously
barred joinder of any additional party to an arbitration dispute
between the Owner and Contractor or the Owner and Archi-
tect.179 These provisions similarly barred consolidation of such
proceedings with any other arbitration proceedings absent the
consent of the contracting parties.18o Thus, prior to 2007, an
Owner with arbitrable claims against both the Architect and Con-
tractor was forced to proceed in two separate arbitrations, even if
the claims involved common questions of law and fact. This pro-
cedural bar to joinder not only increased the Owner's costs as it
fought in two forums, it also created the distinct and unsatisfac-
tory possibility of inconsistent arbitration awards.
The 2007 AIA documents have turned the prior non-
consolidation/non-joinder rules on their head. Section 15.4.4.1 of
the 2007 A201 permits either the Owner or the Contractor to ef-
fectuate the consolidation of their arbitration proceeding with any
other such proceeding if both proceedings: (1) permit consolida-
tion, (2) involve common questions of law or fact, and (3) have
compatible procedural rules.181 Section 15.4.4.2 similarly permits
joinder of additional persons to the Owner/Contractor arbitration
if (1) their presence is necessary to effectuate complete relief, (2)
the joinder will involve common questions of law and fact, and (3)
the non-party consents in writing.182 Finally, section 15.4.4.3
178. SeeAIAA201-1997 § 4.4.6.
179. AIA A201-1997 § 4.6.4; AIA B141(1)-1997 § 1.3.5.4; AlA B151-1997 § 7.2.4.
180. AIA A201-1997 § 4.6.4; AIA B141(1)-1997 § 1.3.5.4; AIA B151-1997 § 7.2.4.
181. AIA A201-1997 § 15.4.4.1.
182. Id. § 15.4.4.2.
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conveys to any entity made a party to the Owner/Contractor arbi-
tration the same rights of consolidation and joinder enjoyed by
the Owner and Contractor. 183
These consolidation/joiner provisions are also made applicable
to the Owner/Architect in sections 8.3.4.1 through 8.3.4.3 of the
2007 B101,184 and sections 4.3.4.1 through 4.3.4.3 of the 2007
B102.185
The result of these consolidation/joinder changes should be a
more efficient resolution of claims by bringing before a single ar-
bitration panel all parties with an interest in common claims,
whether they be the Owner, Architect, Contractor, or Subcontrac-
tors. It is praiseworthy, but surprising, that the AIA has moved
away from a "divide and conquer" procedural bar that undoubted-
ly has worked to the advantage of its membership.
D. Dispute Resolution: Statute of Limitations
The 1997 A201, B141, and B151 all included provisions that
addressed the statute of limitations for the assertion of claims.
Section 13.7 of the A201, section 1.3.7.3 of the B141(1), and sec-
tion 9.3 of the B151 stipulated that the length of the statute of
limitations for asserting claims arising out of the contract was to
be governed by the applicable law of the jurisdiction where the
project was located. 186 The "accrual" of the statute, however, was
not left to state law, but instead was established by contract. For
acts or omissions prior to Substantial Completion, the 1997 doc-
uments stated that the applicable statute of limitations began to
run at Substantial Completion.18 7 For acts or omissions occurring
thereafter, but before issuance of a Final Certificate of Payment,
the statute began to run upon issuance of the Certificate.188 And
finally, for acts or omissions occurring after the issuance of the
Final Certificate of Payment, the statute began to run when the
act or omission occurred. 189
183. Id. § 15.4.4.3.
184. AIA B101-2007 §§ 8.3.4.1-.3.
185. AIA B102-2007 §§ 4.3.4.1-.3.
186. AIA A201-1997 § 13.7; AIA B141(1)-1997 § 1.3.7.3; AIA B151-1997 § 9.3.
187. AIA A201-1997 § 13.7; AIA B141(1)-1997 § 1.3.7.3; AIA B151-1997 § 9.3.
188. AIA A201-1997 § 13.7; AIA B141(1)-1997 § 1.3.7.3; AIA B151-1997 § 9.3.
189. For Virginia architects, the accrual provisions in the 1997 B141 and B151 actually
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The AIA has now abandoned the "three accrual" scheme it im-
plemented only ten years earlier, returning to a full incorpora-
tion, both in terms of length and accrual, of the statute of limita-
tions law of the jurisdiction where the project is located. There is
one exception: The 2007 versions of the A201, B101, and B102
now include a special "repose" provision which deems all claims-
whether sounding in tort or contract-brought more than ten
years after Substantial Completion to be waived.190 Given that
both Virginia's "written contract" statute of limitations1 91 and its
statute of reposel 92 are five years in length, it will be the unusual
case where the ten-year waiver provision could come into play.193
extended the statute of limitations for the benefit of Owners well beyond what the com-
mon law would have otherwise afforded. Under Virginia's common law, the statute of limi-
tations accrues relative to errors in the Architect's plans when they are first delivered to
and approved by the Owner. See Va. Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 759-60, 232
S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977). Section 1.3.7.3 of the 1997 B141(1), and section 9.3 of the 1997
B151, however, as noted in the text, extended the accrual date for design errors to Sub-
stantial Completion, typically one or more years after the Owner's acceptance of the plans.
See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. As discussed in the text below, the 2007
B101 and B102 amendments render the King case again governing law, to the substantial
advantage of Virginia architects. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. But the AIA
has added another provision to the 2007 B101 and B201, which arguably extends the Arc-
hitect's liability for construction administration errors a year longer than before. Sections
3.6.6.5 of the 2007 B101 and 2.6.6.5 of the 2007 B201 include as a Basic Service the Archi-
tect's obligation to return to the project a year after Substantial Completion, should the
Owner request, to "review the facility operations and performance." AIA B101-2007 §
3.6.6.5; AlA B201-2007 § 2.6.6.5. Relying on Virginia's "continuing services" accrual rules,
see, e.g., Harris v. K & K Ins. Agency, 249 Va. 157, 161-62, 453 S.E.2d 284, 286-87 (1995),
Virginia courts could find that under the 2007 B101 and B201, the accrual of the statute of
limitations for construction administration defects will not occur at Substantial Comple-
tion, but instead will extend to a year later when the Architect performs its last obligated
service under the Contract.
190. See AIA A201-2007 § 13.7; AIA B101-2007 § 8.1.1; AIA B102-2007 § 4.1.1.
191. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
192. See id. § 8.01-250 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
193. There is one type of entity that could be adversely affected by the ten-year limita-
tion included in the 2007 amendments-Virginia's public school boards. Like the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, statutes of limitations do not apply to them. See VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-231 (Repl. Vol. 2007). The statute of repose, however, does. See id. § 8.01-250 (Repl.
Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008); School Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 234 Va. 32, 39, 360 S.E.2d 325,
328 (1987). As a result of these statutes and the language in the 2007 AIA documents,
school boards that enter into these contracts, with their claim waiver provisions, could find
themselves ten years after Substantial Completion unable to assert a breach of contract
claim against their Architect or Contractor, which prior to the amendment they would still
possess. The same would be true for the Commonwealth itself, except that, unlike many
school boards, the Commonwealth and its agencies do not use AIA documents.
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E. Dispute Resolution: Arbitration vs. Litigation
One of the most significant changes in the AIA's 2007 docu-
ments is the abandonment of mandatory claim arbitration pur-
suant to the rules of, and administration by, the American Arbi-
tration Association ("AAA"). This is a dramatic departure for the
AIA, which included mandatory arbitration clauses in its con-
tracts for over 100 years. 194
With the 2007 amendments, arbitration must be expressly se-
lected by affirmatively checking a box in section 6.2 of the A101,
section 8.2.4 of the B101, and section 4.2.4 of the B102.195 Absent
such an overt act, the default dispute resolution method under
these contracts is now litigation. In this author's opinion, this
change is long overdue. The right to access the courts for dispute
resolution, including the right to a jury trial, should require an
intentional waiver, as it now does.
Although arbitration is no longer the default forum, the 2007
documents do continue to require mediation, administered by the
AAA according to its rules, as a condition precedent to the prose-
cution of claims by either arbitration or litigation. 196
F. Contractor's Right to Owner's Financial Arrangements
Under the 1997 A201, the Contractor had an unfettered right
to request information on the Owner's financial arrangements for
the project at any time.197 After such inquiry, the Owner had an
affirmative duty to give the Contractor prior notice of any ma-
terial changes in the financing. 198
194. HARNESS, supra note 153, at 5.
195. AIA A101-2007 § 6.2; AIA B101-2007 § 8.2.4; AIA B102-2007 § 4.2.4.
196. Compare AIA A201-1997 § 4.5, with AIA A201-2007 § 15.3; compare AIA B151-
1997 § 7.1, with AIA B101-2007 § 8.2; compare AIA B141(1)-1997 § 1.3.4.2, with AIA B102-
2007 § 4.2.2. If the parties select arbitration for dispute resolution, the new forms
mandate that the arbitration be administered by the AAA under its rules (consistent with
prior versions) and that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 et. seq. (2006), should
govern (a change from prior versions). See AIA A201-2007 § 13.1; AIA B101-2007 § 10.1;
AIA B102-2007 § 7.1. It is clear that the AIA is incorporating federal arbitration law into
its form contracts in order to render that law applicable to all arbitrable claims, even those
involving local projects and intrastate parties without sufficient contact with interstate
commerce to trigger the federal act.
197. AIAA201-1997 § 2.2.1.
198. Id.
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The 2007 A201, in contrast, now grants the Contractor the ab-
solute right to the Owner's financial arrangements only at the
outset of the project.199 The Contractor's right to request supple-
mentation after the project has commenced is only available if (1)
the Owner fails to make a timely payment, (2) changes in the
work materially increase the contract price, or (3) the Contractor
has a "reasonable concern" about the Owner's ability to pay. 200
The new version of the A201 does continue the Owner's obligation
to give notice of any material changes in the financing following a
prior disclosure. 201
G. Owner's Right To Correct Work Deficiencies
The 1997 A201 required the Owner to give two written notices
in the event that the Contractor's default required the Owner to
step in with other forces to cure deficiencies in the Work.202 An
initial seven-day notice was required to permit the Contractor the
opportunity to commence correction, and a second three-day no-
tice was required if the Contractor failed to begin a cure with "di-
ligence and promptness."203 The AIA wisely eliminated the two-
notice requirement, and now only requires the Owner to give a
single notice, with the Owner free to proceed with correction after
ten days if the Contractor does not initiate a cure.204 If the Con-
tractor fails to initiate effective correction within that period, the
Owner is free, without more, to initiate its own cure.205
H. Mandatory Stop Work for Burial or Archaeological Sites and
Wetlands
For the first time, the 2007 A201 includes a provision mandat-
ing that the Contractor stop Work in any Work area where it en-
199. AIA A201-2007 § 2.2.1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See AIA A201-1997 § 2.4.1.
203. Id.
204. SeeAIAA201-2007 § 2.4.
205. Id. Arguably, the AIA should have shortened the cure period to seven days. Why
does the Contractor need ten days, as opposed to seven, to initiate a cure of defective work
of such significance that it stimulated the Owner to put in motion its own curative solu-
tion, a drastic remedy that the Owner would not lightly pursue? Why should Owners be
delayed the three extra days if the Contractor has done nothing in the first seven to in-
itiate corrective work?
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counters human remains, burial sites, archaeological sites, and
wetlands not indicated in the Contract Documents.206 The Con-
tractor must immediately notify the Owner and Architect, and re-
frain from any additional Work in the affected area until it rece-
ives direction on how to proceed. 207 The Contractor may request a
time extension and compensation for the adverse impact from
such Work suspension. 208 These provisions, previously implicit in
the A201 differing site condition clause, 209 are now explicit with
the 2007 amendments.
I. Payment of Subcontractors
The 2007 A201 includes several new provisions dealing with
subcontractor relations. First, section 9.6.2 requires the Contrac-
tor to pay Subcontractors within seven days of payment from the
Owner.210 In the event that the Contractor does not do so, section
9.5.3 permits the Owner to issue joint checks to the Contractor
and unpaid Subcontractor to ensure proper payment.2 11 Finally,
section 9.6.4 grants to the Owner the right to demand written
evidence from the Contractor that the Subcontractors have been
paid, and further permits the Owner to contact the Subcontrac-
tors directly if the evidence is not provided within seven days.212
The effect of these three new payment provisions is to increase
the power of the Subcontractor and Owner on payment issues at
the expense of the Contractor. For instance, a Contractor who has
a meritorious setoff right against a Subcontractor as a result of
prior defective performance may now face contractual obstacles to
its enforcement. Permitted direct communications between a
sympathetic Owner and complaining Subcontractor will likely
trigger the joint check arrangement. The disputed funds will, in
turn, remain with the Owner until the Contractor compromises
and secures the Subcontractor's endorsement to the joint check,
or obtains a judgment establishing its sole ownership of the dis-
puted funds. Sophisticated Contractors are likely to seek modifi-
206. See AIA A201-2007 § 3.7.5.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. AIA A201-1997 § 4.3.4.
210. AIA A201-2007 § 9.6.2.
211. Id. § 9.5.3.
212. Id. § 9.6.4.
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cation of these provisions to ensure they retain their traditional
power to control how Owner payments are dispersed to proble-
matic Subcontractors. 21 3
J. Insurance Obligations
For the first time, the AlA imposed a duty on the Contractor in
section 11.1.4 of the 2007 A201 to name the Owner and Architect
as "additional insureds" on its commercial liability policy. 214 This
change provides the Owner and Architect coverage under that
policy for the Contractor's negligent acts or omissions during the
project. Section 11.1.2 of the 2007 A201 also now requires the
Contractor to include "completed operations" coverage as part of
its policy, which will extend the additional insured protection to
liability arising after completion of the project. 215 These provi-
sions, although new to the A201, are consistent with modifica-
tions Owners have typically made to prior versions of the General
Conditions during contract negotiations to effectuate these pru-
dent changes.
Additionally, section 2.5 of the 2007 B101 and section 1.5 of the
B102 for the first time impose insurance obligations on the Archi-
tect, requiring the maintenance of general liability, automobile
liability, workers' compensation, and professional liability cover-
age during the project. 21 6 These provisions treat the Agreement's
default coverage as the limits the Architect "normally maintains,"
with the Architect entitled to reimbursement for any additional
coverage the Owner may require. 217 One benefit from these
changes is that they compel the Owner and Architect to discuss
213. For the first time in fifty years, the Associated General Contractors ("AGC"), one
of the most prominent contractor trade organizations, did not endorse the 2007 changes to
the A101/201. Press Release, Assoc. Gen. Contractors, AGC Members Unanimously Vote
Against A201 Endorsement (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.acg.org/cs/news-me
dia/press room/pressrelease?pressrelease.id=72. The new payment provisions addressed
in the text are undoubtedly among the changes the AGC found to lack balance. But an al-
ternative explanation for the AGC's refusal to endorse is its decision to join with other
trade associations in 2007 to create a competing set of construction documents generically
referred to as ConsensusDocs. See Consensus Docs-The New United Voice for Construc-
tion Contracts, http://www.consensusdocs.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
214. AIAA201-2007 § 11.1.4.
215. AIA A201-2007 § 11.1.2.
216. AIA B101-2007 § 2.5; AlA B102-2007 § 1.5.
217. AIA B101-2007 § 2.5; AIA B102-2007 § 1.5. Presumably, if the Architect does not
"normally maintain" any professional liability coverage, the Owner will be required to pay
the cost for a policy as a permitted reimbursable expense if such coverage is desired.
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the types of coverage the Architect normally maintains, particu-
larly the professional liability coverage, and to negotiate whether
the Owner is willing to pay for coverage the Architect does not
normally carry.
K. The Architect's Site-Visit Responsibility
In 2007, the AlA made a dramatic change to the Architect's
site-visit obligations. Previously, section 2.6.2.1 of the 1997
B141(2) and section 2.6.5 of the B151 imposed a duty on the Arc-
hitect to "endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and defi-
ciencies in the Work" while conducting periodic site visits.2 18 This
duty was consistent with what Owners have traditionally ex-
pected their Architects to perform while at the site. The duty was
also consistent with the reasonable care obligation that tradition-
ally applied to Architects' services at common law. 219 In 2007,
however, the AIA deleted any reference to an "endeavor" duty,
replacing it in sections 3.6.2.1 of the B101 and 2.6.2.1 of the B201
with the duty to report only "known deviations from the Contract
Documents ... and defects and deficiencies observed in the
Work."220
Over the course of the next decade, it will be interesting to see
if Owners will agree generally to a site-visit provision that only
obligates the Architect to report observed deficiencies, but impos-
es no affirmative duty on the Architect to look for such deficien-
cies (which duty can be negligently breached). Another interest-
ing question is whether courts will interpret the change as
relieving the Architect from liability when negligent observation
is the reason for the Architect's failure to "observe" and "report"
defects. Virginia case law, at least by dictum, suggests that Own-
ers can contract away the reasonable care standard that normally
applies to the Architect's performance, and the 2007 amendments
surely seek to do just that.221
218. AIA B141(2)-1997 § 2.6.2.1; AIA B151-1997 § 2.6.5.
219. See, e.g., Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 195 Va. 431, 443, 78 S.E.2d 901, 908
(1953).
220. AIA B101-2007 § 3.6.2.1 (emphasis added); AIA B201-2007 § 2.6.2.1 (emphasis
added). To ensure consistency with the Owner/Contractor Agreement, the AIA made the
same changes to sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 of the 2007 A201. See AIA A201-2007 §§ 4.2.2-.3.
221. See, e.g., Nelson v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 228, 235, 368 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1988)
(noting that "[a]bsent a provision to the contrary," an Architect owes the Owner a duty to
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Yet another question is how Virginia courts will reconcile Vir-
ginia Code section 54.1-411 with the AIA's efforts to remove by
contract the issue of due care from the site-visit duty. Section
54.1-411 prevents any business entity from limiting the liability
of any licensed architect for "damages arising from his acts," or
otherwise limiting the liability of the entity itself for the "acts of
its employees or agents."222 This provision would appear on its
face to render unenforceable any effort by contract to limit liabili-
ty for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of arc-
hitectural services.
L. The Architect's Obligation To Design to Applicable Law
Prior to 2007, the B151 did not impose an express obligation on
the Architect to design to applicable law. The obligation had to be
inferred within the Architect's duty to perform its design services
reasonably. Section 3.2.1 of the 2007 B101, however, now includes
a specific obligation on the Architect's part to "review laws, codes,
and regulations" during the Schematic Design Phase.223 The
same provision exists in section 2.2.1 of the 2007 B201.224
These changes present an interesting question. Unlike the
1997 B151, the prior 1997 B141(1) did impose a general duty on
the Architect to "review laws, codes, and regulations."225 The ab-
sence of any limitation on this duty rendered the code review ob-
ligation applicable for the entire length of the project. Do the
2007 changes, which impose a code review obligation only in the
earliest Schematic Design phase, manifest an intent to free Arc-
hitects of any duty to design to code during the later Design De-
velopment and Construction Documents phases? Such an intent
exercise professional care in performing construction administration). One way that courts
may negate the AIA's effort to remove a "professional care" duty from the Architect's site
visit obligations is to focus on section 2.2 of the B101 or section 1.2 of the B102. These sec-
tions stipulate that the Architect will perform its services "consistent with the professional
skill and care ordinarily provided by architects practicing in the same or similar locality
under the same or similar circumstances." AIA B101-2007 § 2.2; AIA B102-2007 § 1.2. The
courts could conclude that the AIA's elimination of the "endeavor to guard" language in
favor of the more limited "report known deficiencies" language does not eliminate the duty
to exercise reasonable care in performing site visits, the breach of which will give rise to
liability for unreported and reasonably observable defects.
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-411 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
223. AIA B101-2007 § 3.2.1.
224. AIA B201-2007 § 2.2.1.
225. See AIA B141(l)-1997 § 1.2.3.6.
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would not make sense, however, because most of the design for
the project-particularly the design impacted by code issues-
takes place during these later phases. Despite this, the placement
of the code review obligation only in the Schematic Design Phase
surely suggests the AIA's intent to so limit the obligation. Un-
doubtedly, sophisticated Owners will address this issue during
contract negotiations.
M. Abandonment of the "Fixed Cost of Construction" Scheme
Under the 1997 B141 and 1997 B151, the Architect's participa-
tion in budget considerations during the design phase did not car-
ry adverse impact unless the Architect had agreed in writing to
design to a fixed cost. 226 If the Architect did accept "fixed cost"
design obligations and Contractor bids or proposals came in above
the "fixed cost" target, then section 2.1.7.6 of the 1997 B141(2)
and section 5.2.5 of the 1997 B151 required the Architect, at the
Owner's election, to redesign the project to bring it back within
budget at no cost to the Owner. 227
The 2007 B101 and B102/B201 have no "fixed cost" provision.
Instead, these agreements simply obligate the Architect-without
cost to the Owner-to redesign to the Owner's budget in the event
of a bid bust.228 In the author's opinion, these changes make
sense and are consistent with Owner expectations.
N. Termination and the Right To Use the Architect's Plans
The 1997 B141(1) and B151 allowed the Owner to use the Arc-
hitect's plans upon a termination of the Agreement only if the
Architect was "adjudged" to have defaulted on the Agreement. 229
The 2007 versions of these Agreements dramatically change the
226. See AIA B141(1)-1997 §§ 1.3.1.1-.3; AIA B141(2)-1997 §§ 2.1.7.2-.6.; AIA B151-
1997 §§ 5.2.1-.5.
227. AIA B141(2)-1997 § 2.1.7.6; AIA B151-1997 § 5.2.5.
228. AIA B101-2007 § 6.7; AlA B201-2007 § 5.7.
229. AIA B141(1)-2007 § 1.3.2.2.; AIA B151-1997 § 6.2. Given the time required for the
Owner to adjudicate default, the "adjudged" provision served poorly performing Architects
well. The risk of having no plans to finish an ongoing job either constrained the Owner
from terminating an otherwise negligent Architect or forced negotiation of the right to use
the plans to finish the project after termination. During such negotiations, the poorly per-
forming Architect could leverage the Owner's need for the plans to secure a release from
liability for whatever breach was the cause of the termination.
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rules regarding use of the Architect's plans subsequent to a ter-
mination.
If the Architect terminates the Agreement for cause, the Owner
still loses all rights to use the plans to complete the project, as
was the case under the 1997 version of the B141(1) and B151.230
But under the 2007 Agreements, if the Owner elects to terminate
the Architect "for ... convenience," 231 the Owner is now permit-
ted to use the Architect's plans to finish the project if (1) the
Owner pays a licensing fee;232 and (2) the Owner releases the
Architect from all claims that may arise out of such subsequent
use, and indemnifies the Architect from third-party claims that
may arise out of such use. 233
Finally, if the Owner terminates the Architect for cause, the
Owner is now entitled to use the plans to finish the project with-
out having to pay the licensing fee or provide the release/in-
demnity rights required in a termination for convenience. 234 Sig-
nificantly, the AIA has abandoned the "adjudged" prerequisite set
forth in the 1997 version. Under the 2007 B101 and B102/B201,
the question of whether the Owner possessed the right to use the
plans, after terminating the Architect for default, will not be
known until there is a judicial determination of whether termina-
tion was justified, presumably months or years later. 235 The 2007
Agreements are silent on the Architect's remedy should the Own-
er proceed with the project to completion and then fail to prove
that the "for cause" termination was justified. Most likely, the
Architect's remedies would be confined to the monetary damages
for copyright infringement pursuant to the Federal Copyright
Act.236
230. Compare AIA B141(1)-1997 § 1.3.2.2, and AIA B151-1997 § 6.2, with AlA B101-
2007 B102 § 7.3, and AIA B102-2007 § 3.3.
231. See AIA B102-2007 § 9.5; AIA B102-2007 § 5.5.
232. See AIA B101-2007 § 11.9; AIA B102-2007 § 6.3.
233. See AIA B101-2007 § 7.3.1; AIA B102-2007 § 3.3.1. The same "continued use" rules
apply if the Architect terminates the Agreement because of the Owner's decision to sus-
pend the Agreement more than ninety cumulative days. See AIA B101-2007 §§ 9.3, 9.8,
11.9; AILA B102-2007 §§ 5.3, 5.8, 6.3.
234. See AIA B101-2007 § 7.3.1; AIA B102-2007 § 3.3.
235. The Architect theoretically could seek preliminary injunctive relief, but it is un-
likely a court would act until it heard the default case on the merits, probably long after
completion of the project.
236. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
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0. Architect's "Green"Design Obligations
For the first time, the AIA has included among the Architect's
design obligations the requirement to confer with the Owner re-
garding "green" design alternatives. For instance, section 3.2.3 of
the B101 and section 2.2.3 of the B201 require the Architect dur-
ing the Schematic Design phase to discuss with the Owner "envi-
ronmentally responsible design approaches." 237 Similarly, section
3.2.5.1 of the B101 and section 2.2.5.1 of the B201 obligate the
Architect to "consider environmentally responsible design alter-
natives" involving materials and building orientation in prepar-
ing the Schematic Design.238 If the Owner wants more intensive
"green" design services, such as energy modeling, Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification, or
"unique system designs," it may pay for these as additional ser-
vices. 239
P. The Request-for-Information Obligation
Section 3.6.4.4 of the 2007 B101 and section 2.6.4.4 of the 2007
B201 include for the first time an express obligation on the Archi-
tect's part to review and respond to the Contractor's requests for
information ("RFI").240 These sections further require the Archi-
tect to include in the Contract Documents the requirements for
the Contractor's proper RFI submittal.241 Finally, the sections
permit the Architect to seek compensation for additional services
for RFI review where the conditions of sections 4.3.2 of the B101
or 3.3.2 of the B201 are met 242 (i.e., where the RFI is not submit-
ted consistent with the Contract Documents or seeks information
that the Contractor's "careful study" of various project documen-
237. AIA B101-2007 § 3.2.3; AIA B201-2007 § 2.2.3.
238. AIA B101-2007 § 3.2.5.1; AIA B201-2007 § 2.2.5.1.
239. See AIA B151-2007 §§ 3.2.5.1, 4.1.23-.24; AIA B201-2007 §§ 2.2.5.1, 3.1.23-.24.
240. See AIA B101-2007 § 3.6.4.4; AIA B201-2007 § 2.6.4.4.
241. AIA B101-2007 § 3.6.4.4; AIA B201-2007 § 2.6.4.4. Curiously, the 2007 A201 does
not include a parallel RFI provision, an apparent oversight given that such parallelism
exists regarding the other duties the Architect provides the Owner during Construction
Administration. It may be that the AIA omitted this provision from the A201 because it
intended for the Architect to include all requirements for RFI processing in a set of Sup-
plemental Conditions to the Contract or the technical specifications.
242. AIA B101-2007 § 3.6.4.4; AIA B201-2007 § 2.6.4.4.
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tation would have yielded).243 In this author's opinion, sophisti-
cated Owners are likely to strike the "additional service" right un-
less they include an amendment to the A201 requiring the Con-
tractor to pay for the service. 244
Q. Additional Services
The 2007 Owner/Architect Agreements have materially re-
structured the scope of additional services and the procedures by
which the Architect provides such services. They have done so by
creating four different types of additional services that could be
performed on the project.
First, section 4.1 of the B101 and section 3.1 of the B201 list
twenty-eight categories of "additional services" that the Owner
may purchase by checking the appropriate boxes at the time of in-
itial contracting. 245 Examples include civil engineering 246 and
landscape design. 247 These services largely match what section
2.8 of the 1997 B141(2) and section 3.4 of the 1997 B151 classified
as "optional additional services."248
Second, section 4.3.1 of the 2007 B101 and section 3.3.1 of the
B201 delineate eleven categories of additional services that the
Architect will provide during the project if the Owner authorizes
the work in writing after receiving the Architect's written expla-
nation for why the services are necessary. 249 Examples include
preparing alternate bids250 and attending public hearings. 251
These additional services largely parallel some, but not all, of the
"contingent additional services" in the 1997 B151 and 1997 B141.
Third, section 4.3.2 of the 2007 B101 and section 3.3.2 of the
B201 describe six types of additional services the Architect will
243. See AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.2.2; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.2.2.
244. Why did the AIA not include a parallel provision in the A201 requiring the Con-
tractor to reimburse the Owner for additional services the Owner must pay the Architect
because of the Contractor's RFI-related errors? Symmetry and logic, if nothing else, would
have suggested such a provision.
245. AIA B101-2007 § 4.1; AIA B201-2007 § 3.1.
246. See AIA B101-2007 § 4.1.7; AIA B201-2007 § 3.1.7.
247. See AlA B101-2007 § 4.1.8; AIA B201-2007 § 3.1.8.
248. AIA B141(2)-1997 § 2.8; AIA B151-1997 § 3.4.
249. AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.1; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.1.
250. See AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.1.6; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.1.6.
251. See AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.1.7; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.1.7.
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provide without first obtaining authorization from the Owner in
order to "avoid delay in the Construction Phase."252 Examples in-
clude preparing Change Orders that require evaluation of the
Contractor's proposals and supporting data253 and evaluating the
Contractor's proposed Substitutions.254 Most of these additional
services are consistent with a number of "contingent additional
services" in the 1997 B151 and B141 Agreements. Two significant
additions to the 2007 Agreements are (1) reviewing out-of-
sequence Contractor's submittals;255 and (2) reviewing RFIs
submitted by the Contractor that breach the Contractor's "careful
study" obligation. 256 What is particularly mystifying about these
4.3.2/3.3.2 additional services is that the AIA language is unclear
about whether the Owner is obligated to pay for them. Section
4.3.2 of the B101 and section 3.3.2 of the B201 state that after the
Architect has provided any of the six categories of services de-
scribed therein, it shall submit an explanation for their necessity
to the Owner for consideration. 257 If the Owner then "determines"
that the services were not "required," it shall so notify the Archi-
tect and "shall have no further obligation" to make payment for
such services. 258 A strict reading of this provision would indicate
that the obligation to pay is solely within the Owner's discretion,
based on its own subjective evaluation of necessity. 259 There is no
precedent in earlier versions of the AIA form agreements for an
additional service that is paid for only if the Owner agrees that
the additional service was necessary. It will be interesting to see
how Owners react to an unbridled discretion permitting them to
deny payment for what is clearly deemed an additional service
under the Agreement.
252. AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.2; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.2.
253. See AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.2.3; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.2.3.
254. See AIA BIO-2007 § 4.3.2.5; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.2.5.
255. See AIA B11-2007 § 4.3.2.1; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.2.1.
256. See AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.2.2; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.2.2.
257. AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.2; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.2.
258. AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.2; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.2.
259. There is a tension between the grant of discretion to the Owner in sections 4.3.2 of
the 2007 B101 and 3.3.2 of the 2007 B201, and the preceding sections 4.3 and 3.3. These
preceding sections state that additional services "provided in accordance with [section 4.3
or section 3.3] shall entitle the Architect to compensation." AIA B101-2007 § 4.3; AIA
B201-2007 § 3.3. Do these earlier provisions, with their apparent mandatory "obligation to
pay" language, restrict the absolute discretion to pay or not to pay later conferred on the
Owner? The courts may well indeed be called on to deal with this question when Owners
begin to veto Architect requests for compensation for the additional services set forth in
section 4.3 of the 2007 B101 and section 3.3 of the 2007 B201.
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Finally, section 4.3.3 of the 2007 B101 and section 3.3.3 of the
B201 contemplate the parties filling in certain blanks to establish
quantifiable limits for four Basic Services to be performed during
Construction Administration (shop drawing review, site visits,
Substantial Completion inspections, and Final Completion in-
spections).260 Should events during the project require the Archi-
tect to exceed the specified number, it would be entitled to addi-
tional compensation for "overruns" upon notice to the Owner at
the time the limit is reached.261 There was no similar provision in
the 1997 B151, although there was in the B141.262
R. Concluding Comments
The AIA's 2007 amendments to its most prominent construc-
tion contracts, while numerous, are overall incremental, except
for four substantial changes: (1) the devolution of the Architect's
site visit obligation; (2) the elimination of arbitration as the de-
fault dispute resolution mechanism; (3) the elimination of the an-
ti-consolidation/joinder bars; and (4) the right to use the Archi-
tect's plans upon termination. The first of these major changes is
unfortunate. It constitutes a transparent effort by the AIA to pro-
tect its membership at the expense of the Owner, whose contrary
expectation is that its payments to the Architect to conduct site
visits are to ensure that the Architect, through diligent observa-
tion, detects and reports deficiencies in the Work. That change is
likely to create Owner backlash and amendments to the form con-
tract that increase the Architect's site visit obligation beyond the
minimally demanding "endeavor to guard" predecessor. The other
three changes, in contrast, constitute improvements over past
AJA versions.
It will be interesting to see if the AGC-inspired ConsensusDocs
become a formidable challenge to one hundred years of AIA do-
minance. The author speculates that the Architect's prominent
role early in the design process, long before there is a General
Contractor involved to offer the ConsensusDocs alternative, will
ensure that the AIA documents continue to dominate the con-
struction industry. For another decade at least, it will be the AIA
260. AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.3; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.3.
261. See AIA B101-2007 § 4.3.3; AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.3.
262. Compare AIA B141(2)-1997 § 2.8.1, with AIA B201-2007 § 3.3.3.
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documents that serve as the platform upon which Owners', Archi-
tects', and General Contractors' counsel build as they formulate
the contracts that will govern their projects.
